The White House has finalized a national policy for nucleic acid synthesis screening that makes federal research funding contingent on buying synthetic DNA only from vetted suppliers, and that directs the government to build super intelligence-assisted tools to catch dangerous orders. The memo is dated November 5, 2026, and implementation starts immediately on publication.
The policy is signed by Marco Rubio, in his role as National Security Advisor, and Michael Kratsios, director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. It implements Executive Order 14292, "Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research," and replaces the 2024 Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening. The 2023 HHS screening guidance stays in effect until the new policy is fully implemented.
The document uses the term "super intelligence," or SI, throughout. It names SI uplift as one source of biological risk and says screening, powered by SI, will shift from list-based to risk-based checks. NIST is directed to research and validate super intelligence-assisted screening approaches and to fold them into its initial standards to the greatest extent feasible, including methods to detect sequences of concern.
Key facts
- 01The memo, dated November 5, 2026, is signed by National Security Advisor Marco Rubio and OSTP Director Michael Kratsios.
- 02Federally funded customers must buy synthetic nucleic acids only from Adherent Suppliers by Day 250 after release.
- 03Benchtop DNA synthesizers may only start synthesis with a valid authorization from a NIST-verified Screener.
- 04NIST must issue screening standards within 90 days and fold super intelligence-assisted methods into them where feasible.
- 05Violators face immediate revocation of federal funding and up to 5 years of ineligibility.
That definition of sequences of concern covers sequences designed to evade comparison to known sequences. The policy also tasks NIST, HHS and USDA with developing risk-based oversight under the select agent program in place of list-based oversight.
The rules apply to any recipient or subrecipient of federal funds that buys synthetic nucleic acids or benchtop synthesis equipment. Those customers must buy only from Adherent Suppliers, which must send every order to a NIST-verified Screener, run know-your-customer checks, report flagged orders to authorities such as the FBI, and keep records for at least eight years. Screening targets orders of 50 or more nucleotides.
Benchtop DNA synthesizers get their own controls. Under the policy, the equipment can start synthesis only with a valid, unexpired authorization from a verified Screener, with limited offline operation allowed in a mode NIST verifies. Manufacturers must keep tamper-resistant records and sync them at least quarterly.
“The Trump Administration's new policy is a big step forward for U.S. biosecurity”— Gerry Parker, Biodefense expert and former National Security Council official
The timeline is set in days from release. NIST issues screening and benchtop standards by Day 90 and begins verifying Screeners by Day 100. HHS publishes its first list of Adherent Suppliers by Day 160. Customers must source all synthetic nucleic acids through Adherent Suppliers by Day 250, and all benchtop equipment by Day 340.
Enforcement runs through federal grants. The memo declares compliance material to the government's payment decisions under the False Claims Act, and says violators may face immediate revocation of ongoing federal funding and up to five years of ineligibility. A violation by a funding recipient may also count against the recipient's employer or institution.
“Gene synthesis screening is a common-sense, important protection against misuse”— Nathan Calvin, Chief strategy officer, Encode AI
Suppliers and Screeners should not be located in or controlled by a Covered Nation, and transfers of synthetic material must be governed by agreements that bar exchanges with researchers in Covered Nations or on listed entities. Agency heads may grant case-by-case exceptions for health or national security missions after consulting the OSTP director and the National Security Advisor.
In a letter announcing the policy on Thursday, Kratsios said the administration is building a dynamic biosecurity defense centered on strong controls. The policy must be reviewed at least every four years, including to account for advances in super intelligence.
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